The European experience has clearly demonstrated that the establishment of formal regional institutions such as a free trade area and supranational or intergovernmental institutions can pave the way toward greater regional economic integration. Such institutions are, however, unlikely to emerge unless the region develops its own identity through economic interdependence and creates political support for them (Seliger 2002) .
Trade and investment are what brings national economies together into close economic interdependence and will thus contribute to the process of regional economic integration.
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In this paper we investigate Korea's direct investment in China and its implications for economic integration in Northeast Asia by investigating its effect on bilateral trade between Korea and China and other possible effects on economic integration. These two countries are key players in Northeast Asia and increasing interdependence between the two through trade and investment will significantly contribute to region-wide economic integration, as their increasing interdependence will lead to a greater division of labor, greater scale economies, and a higher rate of growth in their economies and thus create further incentives for other countries to join in.
In the following section we lay out various possible linkages between outward direct investment (ODI) and bilateral trade between home and host countries. It is followed in section II with a discussion of the motives for Korea's ODI in China, based on the surveys conducted by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) and the Korean Export and Import Bank (KEXIM), to shed light on the investmenttrade linkages between the two economies. In section III we investigate the geographical distribution of Korea's ODI within China and its determinants. We offer some concluding remarks in Section IV.
I. Overseas Direct Investment, Trade, and Economic Integration
ODI makes a direct contribution to economic integration of home and host economies by leading to the establishment of an affiliate or a subsidiary in a foreign country and thus transforming a national enterprise into a transnational one. Within this enterprise, as within any internal organizations, there is a hierarchical relationship between home office and affiliates and an up-and-down flow of information and personnel. Such exchange between home office and affiliates is not readily quantifiable as it bypasses the market, but being an intra-firm relationship it is a closer and more intimate personto-person relationship than the typical arm's-length relationship between independent agents across the market and thus has a greater integrative effect on the two economies.
What effect ODI has on the trade relationship between home and host economies is less clear as it can either increase or decrease bilateral trade or may even have no effect at all.
It will have no effect on bilateral trade if it simply creates in the host country an "export platform" for third-country markets and replaces the home-country exports to those markets with the exports from the affiliate. This kind of ODI is most likely to occur when a firm is seeking to minimize the labor cost by relocating its production site. Even in that case, however, ODI will have a positive effect on bilateral trade if the affiliate imports intermediate goods from the home country.
ODI will have a positive effect on bilateral trade if it leads to "reverse importing"-the home country importing the affiliate's output and replacing what has been produced for home market with the goods from the affiliate. This will happen when the home country is losing its comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries and transfers them through ODI to another country that has a latent comparative advantage in the same industries. In this case, seeking to minimize the labor cost is obviously the main motive for ODI. This kind of ODI took place in Japan in the 1970s (Kojima 1996 , Lee 1994 and also in Korea since the mid-1980s, as will be shown below.
ODI will also have a positive effect on bilateral trade if it is for exploiting natural resources that the home country lacks. Its imports of natural resources from the host country may displace its imports from a third country, but this "trade diversion" is likely to be welfare-improving for both countries since for the home country it is from a more costly to a less costly supplier of natural resources and for the host country it expands the market for its natural resources.
ODI will have a negative effect on bilateral trade if it leads to a partial or full displacement of the home country's exports to the host country with locally produced goods. This will occur if the motive for ODI is to serve the host-country market regardless of whether it is to jump a tariff wall or to reduce the cost of serving the market such as the cost of transportation. But even in this case ODI will not completely displace bilateral trade if the affiliates import intermediate products from their parent companies or home-country suppliers.
It is clear from the above discussion on the relationship between ODI and bilateral trade that we can infer the effect of ODI on bilateral trade from its motive. If the motive for ODI is to take advantage of low-cost labor in the host country or exploit its natural resources it is likely to have a positive effect on bilateral trade whereas if the motive is to exploit the host-country market it is likely to have a negative effect (although negligible or even positive if intermediate inputs are supplied from the home country).
These investment-trade linkages are a direct effect of ODI on bilateral trade between home and host countries and do not take into account any indirect effect that ODI may have on bilateral trade through its effect on economic growth. As is well documented in the literature (e.g., Bende-Nabende 2002 , Graham and Wada 2001 , Henley, Kirkpatrick, and Wilde 2002 , OECD 2000 , Tseng and Zebregs 2002 , ODI generally has a positive effect on the economic growth of the host country, and definitely in the case of China, as it brings into it capital, advanced technology, and managerial know-how while increasing competitive pressure on local enterprises and thus enhancing their efficiency.
It is also likely to have a long-run positive effect on the home-country economy by transferring abroad the industries in which it is losing its comparative advantage and thus facilitating structural adjustment in accordance with changing comparative 6 advantage. These changes in both home and host countries will have a positive effect on bilateral trade, provided that it is positively related to economic growth.
If this positive indirect effect of ODI is taken into account, ODI motivated by low-cost labor will have a positive effect on bilateral trade whereas the effect of ODI motivated by the host-country market will remain ambiguous, its sign depending on the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect effects.
In addition to the ODI-trade linkages there is another reason why ODI will have a positive effect on regional economic integration, and that is the backward linkages created by ODI in the host country. To the extent that the affiliates purchase locally produced intermediate goods the local suppliers participate in the production network that runs across national boundaries and become indirectly linked with the affiliates' parent companies. This inclusion into parent companies' production network will have as strong an effect on regional economic integration as bilateral trade, as demonstrated in the case of Southeast Asia and the coastal areas of China where foreign direct investment has been instrumental in promoting economic growth. As will be shown below, Korea's ODI in China has led to extensive local procurement and thus to the inclusion of local Chinese firms into Korean firms' production networks.
II. Motives for Korea's ODI in China and Its Effect on Bilateral Trade
In investigating the effect of Korea's ODI in China on the two countries' bilateral trade we rely on the results of two recent surveys on Korea's ODI, one carried out by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) and the other by the Korean Export-Import Bank (KEXIM). The KIET survey, conducted by two KIET researchers, Ha and Hong (1998) , was based on a sample of 615 Korean companies (216 large firms and 399 small and medium-sized enterprises) and their 952 offshore affiliates. It contains information on the motives for overseas investment, the patterns of sales and procurement, and other activities of offshore affiliates, as reported by their parent companies registered officially as overseas investors in 1996.
The KEXIM survey was based on a smaller sample of 290 large offshore affiliates with an outstanding investment of at least US$10 million as of the yearend of 1998. Of these affiliates, 191 (66 percent) were the affiliates of the top 5 chaebols and 29 (10 percent) the affiliates of the next 25 largest chaebols. Given that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are not included in the KEXIM sample, we hope to draw some inference about ODI by Korea's SMEs and its effect on economic integration by comparing the results of this survey with those of the KIET survey. percent. This is significantly less than the 58.7 percent of the respondents in the KIET survey that reported low-cost labor as the most important motive for investing in China.
Motives for Investing in China
Given that the KEXIM survey covers only the affiliates of large firms whereas the KIET survey covers the affiliates of large firms as well as SMEs, we take the difference in the reported percentage as an indication that the motives for investing in China differ between large firms and SMEs. That is, for large firms the access to markets in China is the most important reason for investing in China whereas for SMEs China's low-cost labor is the most important one. The two surveys also report the motives for ODI by industry, which are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 . It is clear that, as expected, low-cost labor was the most important motive for Korea's ODI in labor-intensive industries. 4 According to the KIET survey (Table 3) , for a majority of firms in the textiles and apparel and the footwear and leather industries, which are all labor-intensive, low-cost labor was the most important reason for investing overseas (72.8 percent and 66.7 percent of the respondents, respectively).
According to the KEXIM survey ( (Table 4 ).
This apparent contradiction with the doctrine of comparative advantage (that is, investment in capital-intensive industries in labor-abundant China) can be easily explained, however, once we recognize the increasingly widespread practice of intrafirm inter-process production arrangements or "international fragmentation" in production process (Jones 2001).
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Production processes in heavy industries involve, relative to light manufacturing industries, a large number of separable sub-processes with different requirements for technology and factor intensity -some sub-processes requiring high-tech materials and component parts and others requiring an intensive use of low-cost labor. A firm in such an industry can minimize the unit cost of producing the final output by locating some processes in countries well endowed in physical and human capital and others in countries where low-cost labor is in abundant supply. For example, it may produce high-tech components in the home country where there is a high technological capability while the assembling of components is done in China where there is an amply supply of low-cost labor. Indeed, many Korean firms in heavy industries have made such production arrangements since the late 1980s by establishing assembly plants in
China. International fragmentation thus makes it possible for a developing country to become a site for producing some parts of a previously wholly integrated process and to acquire new skills and knowledge by producing them.
The Korean affiliates in heavy industries in China may be serving as an export platform for their parent companies. Even though in that case the affiliates' exports from China are displacing exports from Korea, the international fragmentation of production processes has a positive effect on bilateral trade if parts and components are shipped from parent to affiliate firms.
Trade Patterns of Korean Affiliates in China
As discussed in the preceding section, we are able to make some informed guesses about the effect on bilateral trade of Korea's ODI in China from the knowledge of its motives. In this section we try to find additional information on the ODI-trade nexus by looking into the procurement and sales patterns of affiliates as reported in the KIET and KEXIM surveys. This examination will provide us, however, only with a first approximation of the ODI-trade nexus since it does not take into account the indirect linkage effect of ODI that may take place in other sectors in the economy. from Korea, procured more locally and from third countries, implying that Korea's SME-affiliates in China relied more heavily than their large-firm counterparts on imports from Korea and less from local and third-country sources. This difference may be due to the networks of SMEs being more localized in Korea than those of large firms, which we expect to be more global in reach. Another reason might be that, relative to SMEs, large firms are concentrated in capital-intensive industries, which are internationally more fragmented in production processes than labor-intensive industries in which ODI from SMEs is concentrated. contributing to the economic integration of the two countries. Table 6 shows the procurement pattern of offshore affiliates by manufacturing industry, as reported in the KIET survey. Not surprisingly, the share of imports from Korea was small for natural-resource-based industries such as food and beverages (7.2 percent) and basic metals (0.9 percent), the industries in which the motive for ODI is to obtain natural resources in the host country, while the share of local procurement was quite large (91.4 and 98.9 percent, respectively), indicating a strong backward linkage effect of ODI.
2-a. Procurement and Import Patterns
In a number of labor-intensive industries and in some heavy industries the share of imports from Korea was very large. In the former group are the textile and the footwear and leather industries, where the share of inputs imported from Korea was 74.8 percent and 90.8 percent, respectively. In the latter group are the fabricated metals, electrical machinery, motors and freight, and electronics and telecommunication equipment industries, where the share was 96.0, 74.5, 68.9 and 64.7 percent, respectively. For affiliates in those industries local procurement accounted for a small share of intermediate goods and materials, indicating that they are basically assemblers of imported parts utilizing low-cost labor in the host country. <Table 8 here> Table 9 shows that the Korean manufacturing affiliates as a whole sold 66.1 percent of their output in the host countries and exported 9.4 percent to Korea and 24.5 percent to third countries. It also shows a wide industry variation in the shares of local sales and exports. In food and beverage, petroleum and chemicals, non-metallic minerals, basic metals, fabricated metals, machinery and equipment, and motors and freight more than a half of the affiliate output was sold locally. In contrast, in textiles, apparel, footwear and leather, wood, paper and printing, electrical machinery, and electronics and telecommunication equipment more than a half of the output was exported. Reverse imports-exports back to Korea-accounted for 9.4 percent of the entire manufacturing sector output and was especially large in wood (41.9 percent) and electrical machinery (44.4 percent).
The large reverse imports in wood reflect a strategy of Korean firms for developing and importing resource-based products, which are in short supply in Korea. In contrast, the large share of reverse imports of electrical machinery in total sales reflects Korea's changing comparative advantage and the displacement of home production with imports in some consumer durable goods markets in Korea. For large-firm affiliates in China in the footwear and leather industry, third-country markets accounted for 79.5 percent of their total sales; for those in apparel 41.8 percent;
and for those in electronics and telecommunication equipment 34.7 percent. 
III. Sectoral and Geographical Distribution of Korea's ODI in China and Its
Determinants FDI in China is not evenly distributed throughout the country, being highly concentrated in the coastal areas (Broadman and Sun 1997, OECD 2000) . Such geographical concentration implies that the effect of FDI on economic growth and integration into the world economy is not evenly distributed throughout China. If
Korea's ODI follows the same pattern its effect on bilateral economic integration will be also unevenly distributed, some areas in China being more integrated with Korea than others. In this section we investigate the geographical distribution of Korea's ODI in China to find out the spatial distribution of its integrative effect in China.
As is clear on The dependent variable employed in the model is the net cumulative manufacturing investment for 1993-97. For estimation we apply the canonical censored regression model, given that the dependent variable is left censored at zero. All the data for the independent variables are for 1995, a midpoint in the 1993-97 period. 8 We have shown in the preceding sections that there is a significant difference in the motives for ODI as well as in the sales and procurement patterns between large firms and SMEs. Those differences imply that the large-firm affiliates would be much more sensitive to the size of local market and less sensitive to labor cost and would produce more of their output for local markets than SMEs. They also imply a larger regression coefficient of the size of local market (Y) for large-firm affiliates than for SMEs and a smaller absolute value of the negative coefficient of labor cost (W) for large-firm affiliates than for SMEs.
Two sets of regression results are reported on Table 13 . The first set (Model I), which includes all the independent variables discussed above, shows that in the case of SMEs all the explanatory variables are statistically significant and have the correct signs whereas in the case of the large-firm affiliates only the market size (Y) and the policy dummy variable (DP) are significant and have the correct signs. Model I, however, suffers from multi-collinearity as the infrastructure variable (I) is highly correlated with wage (W) and education (E).
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The second set of regression results (Model II), which excludes infrastructure as an independent variable, shows that the estimate of the market size (Y) is positive and statistically significant for both large-firm affiliates and SMEs and is larger for the former than the latter, a result consistent with the survey results discussed in a preceding section.
The estimate of the wage-rate coefficient is negative for both large firms and SMEs, as expected, but is statistically significant only in the case of SMEs. This result is consistent with the survey result that low-cost labor is the most important motive for SMEs but not for large-firm affiliates. There is also a notable difference between largefirm affiliates and SMEs with respect to the effect of labor quality (E) on Korea's ODI in China. The coefficient of this variable is much larger for large-firm affiliates than for SMEs.
<Table 13 here>
These results are consistent with the observation made earlier that investments in China by SMEs are concentrated in low-skilled labor-intensive industries such as textiles and apparel, footwear and leather, and wood and furniture whereas investments by large firms are concentrated in capital-and technology-intensive industries such as electronics and telecommunication equipment, and motors and freight that require more skilled labor. For the first group of investments low-cost labor is a more important factor in determining where to locate than the quality of labor and conversely for the second.
The dummy variable for preferential policies has a positive and statistically significant coefficient for both large-firm affiliates and SMEs with the effect being stronger on investments from large-firms than those from SMEs. Finally, the estimate of the coefficient of the dummy variable for common culture/language is positive and statistically significant for SMEs but not significant for large-firm affiliates, as expected.
IV. Concluding Remarks
No single motive drives a country's ODI and Korea's case is no exception: Some firms have invested in China to take advantage of its cheap labor and others have invested in China for market access or to secure its natural resources. In spite of such diverse motives the data presented in this paper suggest that Korea's ODI in China as a whole has had a positive effect on the two countries' bilateral trade. We also have found out that Korea's ODI in China is not evenly distributed throughout China, being limited mostly to the coastal areas and the areas with a high concentration of ethnic Koreans.
If by economic integration we mean that capital, labor, and goods and services can move between countries more freely than otherwise, Korea's ODI in China certainly has had and will continue to have a positive effect on the economic integration of the two countries. It will further the integrative process by promoting information and personnel exchange between the two countries and by inducing them to respect contracts, property rights and the rule of law and to realize the importance of cross-border harmonization of rules and regulations concerning trade and investment. These are the effects of ODI that are rarely quantified and seldom discussed in the literature but perhaps are more important for regional integration in the long run.
Recently, at a meeting in Beijing a group of Korean business leaders proposed that China, Japan and Korea establish a joint policy coordination body with the aim of creating a Northeast Asian free trade area (Digital Korea Herald, Friday June 7, 2002) . 10 Creating such an area would be a difficult task in the short run because there are a number of economic, historical and political factors unique to the region that many argue hinder its immediate establishment (Lee, forthcoming; Schott and Goodrich 2001, Seliger 2002). Those factors should not be, however, a barrier to the establishment of a joint policy coordination body, which can carry out the task of promoting trade and investment among them and contributing to the creation of a strong regional identity.
That way it will pave the way toward building formal regional machinery in Northeast Asia.
Lee, Chang-Jae, "Rationale for 2 Economic integration is usually defined as "a state of affairs or a process involving attempts to combine separate national economies into larger economic regions" and takes place through the establishment of formal regional machinery such as a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, or a complete economic union (BendeNabende 2002, p.11). In this paper we take it also to mean increasing economic connectedness between national economies through trade, investment, and labor movement. Thus economic integration can be brought about either through deliberate attempts to create formal regional machinery or by policy changes toward freer trade and investment or technological changes that facilitate trade/investment expansion between national economies.
3 According to Tseng and Zebregs (2002) , the market size is more important as a determinant of European and U.S. FDI in China than for FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan. That is, the motive for investing in China by European and U.S. investors is similar to that of large Korean investors whereas the motive of Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors is similar to that of Korea's SME investors. See also Graham and Wada (2001) . 4 This survey results are consistent with the result of an econometric study that shows that investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan tend to use China to manufacture goods for export to industrialized countries and also tend to be concentrated in labor-intensive industries that only require low-skill labor (Fung, Iizaka, and Parker 2002).
5 Jones (2001) defines international fragmentation in the production process as a phenomenon that allows previously integrated production processes at one location to be separated into various component parts, some of them being "outsourced" to other countries. He adds that international fragmentation does not necessarily occur within a multinational corporation and can take place as arm's-length transactions whereby the market is utilized between firms.
6 Doner (1997) argues that foreign affiliates in developing countries initially tend to rely heavily on their parent companies for intermediate goods but subsequently they reduce their reliance on them as they develop supplier networks inside the host country. His rationale for the proposal is that although establishing a free trade area of China, Japan, and Korea in the near future is unlikely a cooperation body can perform some useful functions such as strengthening the voice of the three countries in the international arena and pave the way to future formal economic integration in the region. 
